Can Washington Really Wean Türkiye Off Russian Energy?

By TC-USA PAC Editorial

Türkiye is suddenly at the center of a geoeconomic test: can US energy and nuclear cooperation—plus long-term LNG deals—turn Ankara’s decades-old dependence on Russian oil and gas into a more diversified, Western-leaning portfolio? The question isn’t academic. It goes to the heart of NATO cohesion, European energy security, and the future of US–Türkiye relations.

What changed—concretely

A 20-year US LNG deal: State energy firm BOTAŞ signed with Mercuria to import roughly 4 bcm per year (≈70 bcm over 20 years) sourced from US terminals, regasified in Türkiye, and in some cases re-distributed to Europe and North Africa. This is not symbolic; it’s volume, tenure, and optionality.

Civil nuclear cooperation: Ankara and Washington signed a Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation MoU, signaling interest in US technology (including potential small modular reactors) as an alternative to Russia’s long shadow via the Akkuyu plant.
Public and diplomatic pressure: The White House pressed Ankara to curb purchases from Russia and Iran, tying energy choices to broader security, sanctions, and defense-industrial issues. Source

Why this matters

Energy as strategy, not just supply: A bigger US share in Türkiye’s gas mix lowers Moscow’s leverage and gives Ankara pricing power as legacy pipeline contracts roll off. Done right, it also strengthens a trans-Atlantic energy corridor through the Eastern Med and Black Sea.
A hub with teeth: Türkiye already has sufficient LNG import capacity to cover annual demand in a pinch. Marrying that capacity to long-term US volumes and flexible re-export options makes the “energy hub” vision more than branding.

The economics (no sugar-coating)

Volume and tenure help—but price rules. Russian pipeline gas can still be competitive. US LNG wins when terms are flexible and when contracts hedge volatility and FX risk.
Contract cliff ahead: As multi-year Russian and Iranian gas contracts approach key renewal windows, Ankara gains leverage to rebalance volumes and clauses—if replacement molecules arrive on time
Domestic and Black Sea play: Any incremental domestic output reduces import pressure and improves Ankara’s negotiating position, amplifying the impact of US LNG optionality.

The politics (where deals live or die)

Security corridors: Projects touch the South Caucasus, Iraq, Syria, and the Eastern Med—each a potential chokepoint for insurance, finance, and timelines. Source
Defense-energy linkage: Washington’s asks on energy intersect with air and naval modernization and sanctions policy. That can accelerate cooperation—or stall it—depending on sequencing and reciprocity. Source

What success looks like (12–24 months)

Steel in the ground: LNG flows start under the BOTAŞ–Mercuria deal on schedule in 2026; ancillary regas/storage capacity is ready.
Contract leverage realized: Renewals with Russia/Iran include lower volumes, greater flexibility, or shorter terms, reflecting a credible US alternative.
Nuclear track advances: Feasible US-linked civil nuclear projects clear pre-FEED/FEED gates with bankable structures (including SMR pilots where appropriate).

What could derail it

Price shocks or FX volatility that erase LNG competitiveness. Reuters
Geopolitical flare-ups along transit routes that spike risk premia. Atlantic Council
Regulatory drift that delays permits or erodes investor confidence.

Fact: Türkiye has signed serious energy deals with the US and opened a civil nuclear cooperation lane.
Result: Ankara gains leverage to rebalance supply and strengthen its hub role, while ties with Washington become more transaction-driven and resilient.
Could be: If projects hit milestones on time, Türkiye’s energy mix gets more diversified, Europe’s corridor gets stronger, and Turkish-American stakeholders see more stable prices, more investment, and more opportunity.