This panel — described as the Board of Peace’s executive committee/operational arm in the reporting — is meant to oversee a Palestinian technocratic body responsible for basic services, called the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). The Times of Israel

The White House also named Nickolay Mladenov as a key on-the-ground link between the board and the technocratic administration, and appointed Maj. Gen. Jasper Jeffers to lead an International Stabilization Force concept tied to Gaza security and demilitarization, though reporting notes the force’s exact mandate and contributors remain in flux. The Times of Israel

In other words, the operational question is less “Are Türkiye and Qatar taking over Gaza?” than: How much influence do they wield over sequencing (withdrawal, demilitarization), enforcement, and day-to-day stabilization decisions — and can Israel block outcomes it considers unacceptable?

Why critics say this is dangerous

The critique, advanced most bluntly by FDD and echoed across Israeli and pro-Israel commentary, has several recurring themes:

1. Perceived alignment and Hamas leverage.
   Critics argue that Türkiye and Qatar have relationships with Hamas (or with political currents aligned with Hamas) that should disqualify them from any governance-adjacent role — especially roles that could shape reconstruction funds, policing arrangements, or the political end-state.

2. Legitimacy and the “international stamp.”
   Even if Gaza is formally administered by Palestinian technocrats, critics worry that putting Türkiye and Qatar on an executive oversight body could grant political cover — for actors on the ground, for financial flows, or for a future arrangement that does not permanently dismantle Hamas’s military capacity.

3. Israeli red lines.
   Reporting shows Israeli leaders objecting not only in principle, but operationally — particularly to any scenario where Turkish or Qatari forces might enter Gaza under a security umbrella. Washington Examiner

These objections are not confined to opinion pages. They have appeared as an explicit political dispute between allies. The Washington Examiner reported that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu described “a dispute” with the U.S. over the composition of the advisory council and vowed that “Turkish or Qatari soldiers will not be in the Strip.”

Why the administration — and some analysts — might accept the risk anyway

There is a counter-argument, less moralistic and more transactional, that helps explain why Türkiye and Qatar keep appearing in the design.

The short version is: they have channels others don’t.

As Foreign Policy reported earlier in the process, diplomats and experts have argued that Doha and Ankara may have leverage with Hamas — and that the administration may need that leverage if it wants any plausible route to disarmament, ceasefire durability, and a transition that does not collapse immediately.

And in a Trump-style system — where policy often moves through leader-to-leader commitments and “results” are defined by whether the next crisis is prevented — the question becomes: Is it better to keep Türkiye and Qatar inside a monitored framework, or outside it, acting independently?

This is also why the argument over “executive power” can be misleading. The reporting suggests that Gaza’s day-to-day administration is intended to be handled by Palestinian technocrats (the NCAG), while the international bodies steer, supervise, and mobilize resources. The Times of Israel

But supervision is power — especially if it influences money, policing, and the sequencing of demilitarization.

What this means for the United States

For Washington, the controversy is a reminder that Gaza’s “day after” is not merely a humanitarian and reconstruction problem. It is an alliance-management problem.

Three implications stand out:

• If the plan fails to constrain Hamas militarily, the political blowback in the U.S. will be severe. The administration will be accused of building a transition that institutionalized the problem it promised to end.
• If the plan sidelines Israel’s security red lines, it risks turning a close relationship into open friction — in public. That friction is already visible in reporting and commentary. Washington Examiner
• If the plan excludes key regional actors with influence, it may be unworkable. That is the logic behind pulling in countries with channels to Hamas — even if doing so is politically costly. Foreign Policy

The administration is effectively attempting something the UN system often struggles to do: marry security enforcement, technocratic governance, and reconstruction financing into one coherent track — under heavy political fire from nearly every direction.

What this means for Turkish Americans

For Turkish Americans, the debate will likely increase visibility and scrutiny — and it will also create an opening for more serious, interest-based advocacy.

• Expect sharper narratives. Türkiye’s inclusion will be framed by critics as “rewarding Hamas enablers,” while supporters will frame it as “using leverage to stabilize.” Turkish Americans will encounter both, often in politicized form.
• The most persuasive lane is U.S. interests, not identity. The strongest argument for Türkiye’s participation — if one is making it — is not ethnic solidarity. It is: preventing ISIS resurgence, ensuring aid delivery is not weaponized, building accountability into reconstruction, and keeping Washington’s leverage over all participants.
• A clear red line matters: transparency and enforcement. If Türkiye is part of an oversight structure, the credibility of that structure will hinge on measurable standards: demilitarization benchmarks, independent monitoring, anti-diversion controls on aid and materials, and consequences for violations.

This is also where organizations like TCUSAPAC can be most effective: emphasizing that any framework involving Türkiye should be judged on outcomes and compliance, not on slogans — and that diaspora advocacy should reinforce American strategic interests and rule-of-law principles.