• Strengthening TPAO (the state oil company).
  Over the past few years, TPAO has:

  • Expanded its offshore drilling program in the Black Sea and Mediterranean,
  • Invested in new seismic and drilling capacity, and
  • Sought technology and capital partners to share risk.
    Deals with ExxonMobil and Chevron give TPAO de facto endorsements from the very top tier of international oil companies.

• Signaling to markets — and Washington.
  Bringing in Exxon and Chevron is not just about geology. It also telegraphs to:

  • Global investors that Türkiye’s upstream sector is open for serious business, and
  • U.S. policymakers that Ankara is willing to anchor part of its energy future in (and through) American capital and technology.

In that sense, these deals are energy policy, industrial policy, and foreign policy all at once.

What this means for the United States

For Washington, the twin moves create both opportunities and new leverage points.

1. Re‑anchoring parts of the relationship in concrete, long‑term projects.
   U.S.–Türkiye ties have been strained for years over Syria, S‑400 air defenses, sanctions, and human rights concerns. Upstream agreements with Exxon and Chevron introduce:

   • Multi‑billion‑dollar, multi‑decade projects,
   • That require regulatory stability, contract sanctity, and working-level cooperation between Turkish and U.S. institutions.

   This is the opposite of “one-off transactional” diplomacy: it ties the relationship to enduring physical assets and shared revenue interests.

2. A counterweight to Russian and Iranian influence.
   Every cubic meter of gas Türkiye eventually produces with U.S. technology, or routes through infrastructure co‑financed by Western capital, slightly reduces:

   • Moscow’s grip over regional energy flows, and
   • Tehran’s leverage via gas supply and energy-linked politics.

   For U.S. strategists focused on Russia containment and Iran pressure, this is a non-trivial benefit that comes without U.S. budget outlays.

3. New channels — and new friction points — for policy.
   The presence of Exxon and Chevron upstream in Türkiye:

   • Gives U.S. diplomats additional channels to discuss sanctions risk, export controls, environmental standards, and regional security,
   • But also creates potential friction: if relations sour, American political actors may push to condition or politicize U.S. corporate involvement.

   In other words, these deals deepen interdependence — which can be stabilizing in calm periods and combustible in crises.

How this intersects with Trump-era energy politics

Under President Trump, energy has been a central language of diplomacy. Major LNG export deals, upstream access, and U.S. oil exports have often been tied to broader political relationships.

The Türkiye–Exxon–Chevron triangle fits that pattern:

• It gives Trump officials a positive narrative: U.S. companies helping a key NATO ally expand production, diversify away from Russia, and underpin regional supply.
• It offers a platform for leader-to-leader announcements — new rounds of investment, FIDs (final investment decisions), or export contracts — that can be showcased as evidence of “strong ties” even when security debates are difficult.
• It potentially aligns with Trump’s broader effort to see U.S. companies at the center of global hydrocarbons for as long as those fuels dominate.

At the same time, this approach raises familiar questions about environmental and climate policy: critics will argue that locking in long‑lived oil and gas infrastructure delays decarbonization. That debate will now run straight through any big new Turkish discoveries made with U.S. help.

What this means for Turkish Americans

For Turkish Americans and organizations like TCUSAPAC, the Chevron and Exxon news has three practical implications.

1. A more balanced story to tell in Washington.
   For years, discussions of Türkiye on Capitol Hill and in think tanks have been dominated by:

   • Syria policy and Kurdish forces,
   • S‑400s and NATO cohesion, and
   • Domestic politics.

   These upstream deals allow Turkish Americans to add a different, concrete chapter to that story:

   • Türkiye as a partner in energy diversification,
   • Helping reduce dependence on Russia and Iran, and
   • Creating opportunities for American workers, technology providers, and investors.

2. A chance to argue from U.S. interests, not just identity.
   The most persuasive message in Washington is not that Türkiye “deserves” these deals, but that they:

   • Advance U.S. strategic interests in energy security and Russia/Iran containment,
   • Support American companies and jobs, and
   • Encourage rule-of-law and investment stability in a key NATO ally.

   Turkish Americans can emphasize that supporting a predictable, law‑governed investment climate in Türkiye is in the U.S. interest — precisely because U.S. companies now have growing exposure there.

3. Higher expectations — and more scrutiny.
   With Exxon and Chevron at the table, U.S. lawmakers and regulators will pay closer attention to:

   • Contract stability and arbitration,
   • Environmental and safety standards, and
   • Any overlaps with sanctions or export controls (for example, if project design ever touches Russian technology or financing).

   This raises expectations on Ankara — and gives diaspora advocates a reason to press for transparency, predictability and compliance as shared goals, not as external “demands.”