A New Chapter: Why Trump’s Republicans Offer a Stronger Path for U.S.–Türkiye Relations

Obama-Era Strains: U.S. Support for YPG and the PKK Dilemma

Under President Barack Obama and Democratic leadership, U.S.–Türkiye relations became increasingly strained – largely due to Washington’s collaboration with Kurdish militias in Syria that Ankara links to the PKK insurgency. Notably, the Obama administration chose to partner with the Syrian Kurdish YPG militia (the core of the Syrian Democratic Forces, or SDF) to fight ISIS, even though Turkey viewed the YPG as indistinguishable from the PKK – a terrorist organization blacklisted by both Turkey and the United States. This decision planted seeds of distrust in Ankara. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan openly accused Obama of breaking promises, saying “with President Obama, we had a mutual agreement about the PKK – but Obama deceived us” – From Turkey’s perspective, the U.S. was helping one terrorist group to defeat another. “The YPG is an arm of the PKK. We can’t destroy one terrorist group with another… We are strategic partners with the U.S.,” Erdoğa warned in 2017, underscoring Turkey’s sense of betrayal as its NATO ally armed a group tied to the PKK, which has waged a deadly insurgency against the Turkish state for decades. Source

Independent analysts note that this policy contradiction – supporting the YPG/PYD in Syria despite its PKK links – was a “ticking time bomb” in the relationship. The short-term U.S. imperative to crush ISIS by “outsourcing” ground fighting to Kurdish fighters directly clashed with Turkey’s top security concern as a NATO ally: the PKK/YPG threat on its border. What may have begun as ad-hoc tactical cooperation with the Syrian Kurds against ISIS soon morphed into a strategic rift between Washington and Ankara. Indeed, observers argue that the confrontation between Turkey and U.S.-backed YPG forces was virtually inevitable – “hardwired” into the Obama-era counter-ISIS strategy. Ankara’s trust eroded further when promises made to Turkey were perceived as only half-kept. U.S. officials had assured Turkish leaders that arms provided to the YPG would eventually be withdrawn once ISIS was defeated. In practice, that promise was only partially fulfilled, amplifying Ankara’s sense of betrayal. Erdoğan expressed open skepticism that the U.S. would ever follow through:

Turkish intelligence tracked American-supplied weapons by serial number, “and they [the Americans] said that they will collect the weapons when all is done. I do not find this sincere,” Erdoğan remarked in early 2019. He stressed that Turkey’s goal was to see YPG elements completely removed from Manbij and their U.S.-supplied arms taken back “as promised” – – a promise Turkey feared Washington was stalling on. All of this left U.S.–Türkiye relations frayed, with Ankara doubting the commitment of its ally and feeling its existential concerns were being ignored. Source

Shift Under Trump: A More Predictable, Respectful Approach

The Trump administration marked a decisive shift in tone and strategy that aimed to rebuild trust with Turkey. Republicans – led by President Donald Trump – signaled a more predictable, respectful approach towards Ankara’s security concerns, particularly regarding the Kurdish issue. This was exemplified in recent remarks by Ambassador Tom Barrack, Trump’s appointee as U.S. Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria. Barrack unequivocallyreiterated that Washington does not support creating any independent Kurdish statelet in Syria, emphasizing that U.S. policy remains committed to Syria’s territorial integrity. SDF is YPG. YPG is a derivative of PKK,” he explained – bluntly acknowledging that America’s Syrian Kurdish partner is the Syrian offshoot of Turkey’s foe. Barrack stressed that while the U.S. did ally with the YPG/SDP to defeat ISIS, “we don’t owe them the ability to have their own independent government within a government.” In other words, helping the Kurds in wartime “doesn’t mean”Washington will bless a separate Kurdish administration on Syrian soil. There is “no indication” of a “free Kurdistan” or separate SDF state in Syria, Barrack said – “There’s Syria.” All ethnic and sectarian groups must remain part of one Syria, rather than splintering into autonomous enclaves. Such clarity on U.S. support for a unified Syria directly aligns with Turkey’s long-held red line against any de facto Kurdish statehood emerging from the conflict.

Equally important, the Republican approach under Trump prioritized transparency and respect in how the U.S. engages on the Syria issue. Barrack highlighted that the U.S. sees its role as a facilitator, not an occupier or puppet-master, in Syria’s post-war future. “We’ll bring you together, we’ll arbitrate, we’ll mediate, we’ll help, but we’re not going to stick around… we’re not going to be here forever as the babysitter,” he told reporters. This was a clear signal that the Trump administration did not intend to entrench U.S. forces or empower the SDF indefinitely, a stance that reassured Ankara. Turkey had long feared the U.S. might institutionalize its partnership with the YPG and create a permanent Western-backed Kurdish zone on Turkey’s border. Barrack’s message – that the U.S. will not dictate Syria’s internal arrangements or stay “forever” to guard the SDF – was welcomed in Ankara as a return to a more traditional, state-centric approach. It also showed a newfound U.S. willingness to defer to regional players (like Turkey and the Syrian people themselves) rather than unilaterally calling the shots.

This more respectful posture quickly improved the diplomatic climate. As Ambassador Barrack candidly observed, during the Obama (and later Biden) years Turkey “was not loved – and they felt not loved” in Washington. Turkish officials often complained that their American counterparts were dismissive of Turkey’s security concerns. Under President Trump, however, Ankara sensed a change. Barrack noted that Trump and President Erdoğan had “done a fantastic job of clawing back at each other and redefining the relationship that was left empty”. In other words, the two leaders reopened channels of communication and rebuilt personal rapport where trust had eroded. Notably, even as Trump’s White House continued the anti-ISIS campaign (indeed, Trump’s term – like Obama’s – relied on the SDF as the primary local partner against ISIS, the political parameters of that cooperation shifted. The Republicans were far more explicit that U.S. support for the SDF was conditional and temporary – a tactical alliance against a common enemy, not an endorsement of Kurdish separatism. That clarity made U.S. actions more predictable to Turkey, lowering the sense of betrayal. Erdoğan himself, who once praised Trump as a “strong leader,” showed optimism that Trump’s team “would not do the same” as Obama in overlooking Turkey’s PKK grievances. In short, Trump’s approach took Turkey’s history and priorities to heart, treating Turkey like the valued NATO ally it is, rather than just a squeaky wheel in the Syrian conflict.

No Kurdish State, No Partition: Aligning with Ankara’s Security Priorities

Ambassador Barrack’s briefing in July 2025 distilled the Trump-era doctrine on Syria – one that happens to dovetail with Turkey’s interests. Several key principles emerged, all of which strengthen U.S.–Türkiye relations:

No Independent Kurdish Enclave: The United States flat-out rejects the idea of carving a “free Kurdistan” or separate SDF-run entity out of Syrian territory. Barrack stated this in no uncertain terms, emphasizing that the U.S. vision is for a sovereign, unified Syria with no sectarian or ethnic breakaways. “There’s not an indication that there’s going to be a separate SDF state… There’s Syria,”he said, also noting that even Syria’s own interim government firmly opposes any federalism or partition. This assurance was music to Ankara’s ears. Turkish leaders have always been alarmed by the prospect of an autonomous Kurdish region in Syria (akin to the KRG in Iraq), fearing it would become a PKK-controlled haven on Turkey’s border. By affirming Syria’s unity, Republicans signaled to Turkey that U.S. policy would not allow an outcome that Turkey considers an existential threat.
Acknowledging the YPG–PKK Link: Unlike the hesitant rhetoric of the past, U.S. officials under Trump openly recognize the reality that Turkey sees on the ground: the SDF’s leading component, the YPG, is essentially the Syrian branch of the PKK. Barrack did not sugarcoat this fact – “YPG is a derivative of PKK,” he said plainly. This candor matters deeply to Turkey. All NATO members, including the U.S., have listed the PKK as a terrorist organization for decades, and Turkey has suffered terribly from PKK violence. By admitting the familial ties between the YPG and PKK, the U.S. is validating Turkey’s concern that arms given to the YPG could one day threaten Turkish soldiers and civilians. Barrack’s admission also implicitly acknowledged that Turkey’s outrage in prior years was understandable. The shift in tone – from denial or evasion of the YPG–PKK connection to frank admission – helped restore Turkish confidence that Washington is not turning a blind eye to its security. (As Turkish officials have often pointed out, “both the PKK and the YPG are terrorist organisations and they are no different, apart from their names”. This new U.S. stance sends a powerful message: America hears Turkey’s concerns and is factoring them into policy. Source This new U.S. stance sends a powerful message: America hears Turkey’s concerns and is factoring them into policy.
No U.S. Endorsement of Partition or Kurdish “Statelet”: Barrack made it crystal clear that the U.S. is not in the business of redrawing Syria’s map or imposing a political solution that carves out ethnic mini-states. “The U.S. is not dictating outcomes in Syria,” he explained, and it “doesn’t endorse federalism” that would break Syria into pieces. In practice, this means Washington will not support any kind of de facto Kurdish autonomous zone that splits from Damascus. Barrack even dismissed the notion of separate sectarian forces: “You can’t have a separate Druze force… separate Alawite force… separate Kurd force… There’s going to be one entity.”. All militias must ultimately be integrated into one national army. Again, this stance mirrors Turkey’s view that Syria must remain whole. During the Obama years, Turkish analysts feared that U.S. flirtation with the PYD/YPG was laying the groundwork for a decentralized or fragmented Syria (sometimes dubbed a “federal” solution) that would legitimize a Kurdish region. The Republican position under Trump vehemently rejects that: no independent Kurdish administration, no fragmentation – Syria’s territorial integrity is paramount. This not only reassured Turkey, but also kept faith with a core principle of international diplomacy (upholding recognized borders). Notably, it aligned the U.S. more closely with Turkish and even Iraqi policy, since Baghdad also opposes any spillover of Kurdish independence sentiments beyond Iraq’s Kurdistan Region.

Temporary Partnership, Not a Blank Check: A significant nuance in the Trump-era approach is distinguishing between military cooperation and political support. The U.S. remains grateful to the SDF/YPG for fighting ISIS – these fighters “fought valiantly” and suffered heavy losses alongside American forces. However, Barrack underscored that American “gratitude” does not equate to backing the SDF’s political project. “There’s a big sentiment that, because they were our partners, we owe them,” he said. “The question is, what do we owe them? We don’t owe them the ability to have their own independent government within a government.” Instead, what the U.S. owes its Kurdish partners is a path to safely reintegrate into Syria once ISIS is truly defeated. Barrack described offering the SDF a fair political “on-ramp” into a new Syrian regime – a framework where Kurdish-led regions can negotiate their place in a unified state. In practical terms, that might mean helping broker arrangements for local self-administration or rights within Syria, but not endorsing outright secession or permanent U.S. protection. This calibrated view – honor the partnership but uphold Syria’s unity – is a departure from the more ambiguous approach of previous years. It sends a clear diplomatic signal to Ankara: the U.S. will not institutionalize its alignment with the YPG in a way that undermines Turkey. As Barrack put it, “we owe them an onramp” to rejoin Syria under a reasonable deal – nothing more. That sentiment goes a long way toward rebuilding Turkish trust, as it shows America values its ally’s long-term stability over any short-term wartime alliance.

During a press briefing at the Foreign Press Center in New York on July 11, Tom Barrack, the US Ambassador to Türkiye and Special Envoy for Syria, clearly rejected the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Syria and reiterated Washington’s stance on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Source

America as Mediator, Not Permanent Overseer: Under Republican guidance, the U.S. has also been careful to signal its limits in Syria. Barrack’s “babysitter” comment above illustrates that Washington does not intend to act as an indefinite guardian or occupier in Syria. “We’ll arbitrate, we’ll mediate… but we’re not going to stick around forever,” he emphasized. The subtext for Turkey is reassuring: eventually, the U.S. will step aside and let regional actors (including Turkey, Russia, Iran, and the Syrians themselves) find a lasting settlement. This addresses a major Turkish fear from the Obama era – that the U.S. would create facts on the ground (like arming and training a Kurdish army) and then stay to enforce a semi-independent Kurdish region under American patronage. Trump’s pullback instincts meant that, if anything, the U.S. was inclined to withdraw forces once ISIS was beaten, even if it meant Turkey taking a more active role in northern Syria. In 2019, for example, Trump’s abrupt troop withdrawal from parts of Syria paved the way for Turkey’s cross-border offensive against YPG forces (Operation Peace Spring). While controversial in Washington, that move satisfied Ankara’s desire to create a buffer zone free of YPG fighters. Barrack’s comments reinforce that the U.S. sees itself as a facilitator – helping negotiate arrangements like the SDF’s integration into the Syrian army – but not as a permanent power guaranteeing the SDF’s autonomy. For Turkey, which often complains about foreign powers meddling in its neighborhood, this stance is a welcome acknowledgement of Turkish primacy in regional security matters. Source

Beyond policy declarations, the Republican outreach to Turkey also recognized symbolic and historical matters. Ankara has always insisted that the PKK fight is not just its problem but a concern all allies should heed. In mid-2025, a remarkable development underscored this point: approximately 30 PKK militants in northern Iraq publicly laid down their arms in a ceremony, following a call by imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan to end the armed struggle. President Erdoğan hailed this disarmament gesture as “a new page in history” – the possible beginning of the end of a 40-year insurgency. Ambassador Barrack, in turn, highlighted the event as “a very big development for Türkiye”. By drawing attention to this milestone, U.S. officials showed an appreciation for how profoundly the PKK issue affects Turkey. Supporting a peace process (or at least recognizing progress) on the PKK front is crucial to convincing Ankara that Washington truly values Turkish security. It also aligns with NATO’s stance, since the PKK is universally condemnedacross NATO capitals as a terrorist group. If the PKK conflict genuinely winds down, Turkey will feel less threatened by Kurdish autonomy anywhere – which could make it easier to find a compromise formula for Syria’s Kurds as well. In short, Republicans understand that helping Turkey solve its PKK problem is integral to regional stability. By not overlooking Turkey’s decades-long fight – and even offering diplomatic support for its resolution – the U.S. under Trump strengthened its credibility with a critical ally.

A Balanced Path Forward: Restoring Trust with Ankara Without Abandoning Allies

The contrast between the Obama-era approach and the Trump-era approach to U.S.–Türkiye relations is stark. Under Obama, Turks saw a U.S. that paid lip service to their security while bolstering a faction they deem an existential threat. Under Trump, the tone shifted to one of reassurance and respect: Turkey’s concerns were no longer downplayed but addressed head-on. This does not mean the U.S. simply dumped the SDF – rather, it means the partnership with the Syrian Kurds was reframed within clear limits. As one analysis noted, the challenge for Washington has been balancing “keeping trust with Türkiye, a NATO ally that sees the PKK/YPG as a top national threat,” with “respecting the sacrifices of the SDF” in the fight against ISIS – but “not at the cost of permanently fracturing Syria. The Trump administration’s policy pivots suggest that such a balance is achievable. By affirming that the Syrian Kurds must remain part of Syria and that U.S. troops will not indefinitely shield them, Republicans in power signaled to Turkey that its friendship is valued more than ever. At the same time, the U.S. continues to urge a negotiated outcome where the SDF can integrate into the Syrian state (rather than be destroyed). This middle path – neither betraying the Kurds nor alienating the Turks – is admittedly a delicate tightrope. But it is one that U.S. policymakers seem intent on walking. As Barrack put it, there “hasn’t been a new story for a hundred years” in this region; boundaries and ethnic issues date back to the Ottoman era, and outside powers have to navigate them with care. Today, even Russia and China, he noted, have an interest in “seeing calmness in the area”. Washington’s goal, then, is to prevent a power vacuum or renewed conflict – which requires the buy-in of local powers like Turkey.

Early signs indicate that Ankara appreciates this more nuanced U.S. strategy. Turkish officials often lament that previous American administrations simply “didn’t understand” Turkey. By contrast, many in Ankara feel the Republicans under Trump better grasp Turkey’s historical sensitivities – from the legacy of the Kurdish issue to Turkey’s role as a frontline NATO ally. Indeed, Ambassador Barrack’s praise for Turkey’s regional importance (from mediating in Ukraine-Russia to supporting stability in the Middle East) and his reference to Turkish leaders like Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın acting “on behalf of regional diplomacy” show a newfound respect for Turkey’s agency. Rather than viewing Turkey as a troublesome junior partner, the Trump team treated Turkey as a key stakeholder whose friendship is worth nurturing. “President Trump and President Erdoğan have… redefined the relationship” in a positive way, Barrack observed. This emphasis on personal diplomacy and understanding each other’s core interests has paid dividends. While serious disagreements (like Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missiles or U.S. sanctions) have not vanished, the tenor of dialogue has improved markedly. There is a sense in Ankara that it is finally being heard in Washington.

The Republican-led shift in U.S. strategy – characterized by predictability, open acknowledgment of Turkey’s security concerns, and a commitment to Syria’s unity – offers a stronger foundation for U.S.–Türkiye relations going forward. It represents a new chapter where old allies can rebuild trust. By avoiding the mistakes of the past (such as appearing to sponsor a PKK-linked enclave on Turkey’s border) and by valuing Turkey’s friendship, the United States under leaders like Trump has shown that it does know Turkey’s history and priorities. This doesn’t just flatter Ankara; it serves American interests too. Turkey sits at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East, and its cooperation is vital on issues from counterterrorism and refugee crises to checking Russian expansion. A Turkey that feels respected by Washington is far more likely to coordinate closely as an ally. The Obama years taught a hard lesson: when Turkey’s trust is broken, U.S. goals in the region suffer (as seen when Turkey drew closer to Russia and Iran to counterbalance U.S. moves it disliked. The Trump years have begun to repair that trust. As a result, U.S.–Türkiye relations today are on a more solid, frank footing. There is clear understanding that the U.S. will not pursue Kurdish statehood in Syria, and Turkey in turn can remain a steadfast partner in ensuring ISIS remains defeated and the region stays stable. This alignment of strategic interests – forged by a more sensitive Republican approach – bodes well for the alliance. In the words of Erdoğan, after years of discord, Turkey and the U.S. may at last be opening “a new page” in their partnership – one founded on mutual respect, consistency, and an appreciation that neither side is truly secure without the other. Source