A Strategic Opening for U.S.–Türkiye Cooperation

The United States has long encouraged allies to diversify away from Russian and Iranian energy, particularly after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and amid continued concerns over Iran’s regional destabilization efforts. Türkiye’s recalibration aligns closely with these objectives, opening new pathways for U.S.–Türkiye energy cooperation, especially through LNG exports from American producers.

Recent long-term LNG agreements between Turkish buyers and U.S. suppliers underscore this evolving partnership. These deals not only strengthen Türkiye’s energy security but also support American energy exporters at a time when U.S. LNG has become a central tool of global energy diplomacy.

From a U.S. policy perspective, Türkiye’s diversification reduces exposure to sanctioned actors while reinforcing NATO’s collective resilience against energy coercion — a vulnerability Russia has repeatedly exploited in Europe.

Declining Russian and Iranian Leverage

Russian pipeline gas, once accounting for more than 60 percent of Türkiye’s imports, has already fallen to roughly one-third of total supply. Iran’s role is even smaller, and its pipeline contract with Türkiye is set to expire soon. While Ankara has not ruled out future agreements with either country, officials signal that any extensions would likely be shorter, more flexible, and limited in volume.

This matters because Türkiye has served as one of the last remaining gateways for Russian gas into Europe, particularly as the European Union accelerates its plan to fully phase out Russian pipeline and LNG imports by 2027. As Türkiye pivots, Moscow and Tehran face shrinking options — economically and geopolitically.

Türkiye as an Energy Hub, Not a Dependency

Central to Ankara’s strategy is its ambition to become a regional energy hub, rather than a captive consumer. Expanded LNG terminals, floating storage regasification units (FSRUs), and new offshore gas discoveries in the Black Sea have given Türkiye unprecedented flexibility.

By the end of the decade, combined domestic production and LNG capacity could exceed half of Türkiye’s projected demand — allowing Ankara not only to meet its own needs but potentially to re-export gas to neighboring markets, further integrating Türkiye into Europe’s post-Russian energy architecture.

This evolution enhances Türkiye’s strategic autonomy while reinforcing its relevance to U.S. and European policymakers seeking reliable partners in a fractured global energy system.